We compare tradable permit markets and emission taxes as self-enforcing mechanisms to control correlated externality problems. By "correlated" we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities (e.g., smog and global warming). By "self-enforcing" we mean mechanisms that account for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and international permit markets are Pareto efficient, while joint emissions taxes are not.
Introduction
Mechanisms to control transboundary externalities have received a great deal of attention in the recent literature, driven by the onset of such global problems as climate change, atmospheric ozone depletion, and biodiversity loss, as well as problems associated with acid rain.
The mechanisms share two attributes. First, they explicitly account for jurisdictional control over the policy instruments used to mitigate the externality. For example, regional governments may be endowed with the authority to independently levy emissions taxes or select abatement levels while either a central government or the regional governments themselves enact transfers between the various regions of the federation (c.f., Wellisch, 1994; Silva, 1997; Caplan and Silva, 1999; Caplan, et aI., 2000) . Second, the mechanisms are designed to control emissions of a single pollutant and therefore address a particular externality problem. In the case of global warming, for example, sources are assumed to emit solely carbon dioxide (or carbon-equivalent gases), the aggregate of which affects the welfare or production possibilities of the jurisdictions.
In the case of acid rain, sources emit solely sulfur dioxide, which has jurisdictionally dependent effects.
In reality, emissions are typically comprised of multiple pollutants that cause simultaneous localized and global externality problems, and pollution abatement in tum jointly reduces the flows of these pollutants. For example, the burning of fossil fuels generates carbon dioxide (C0 2 ), ozone, nitrogen oxide (NOx) , and sulfur dioxide (S02), which create global externalities, as well as carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds, and particulate matter, which have more localized regional external effects. Destruction of critical wildlife habitat endangers not only non-migratory species that inhabit the area (the local externality), but also migratory species that utilize the area's resources as part of a seasonal pattern of global migration (the global externality).
Abatement technologies, on the other hand, are typically coarse in that they have joint effects on a multiplicity of pollutants.
1 Consider the case of air pollution control. Jet scrubbers used to remove dust particles from a gas stream with a dispersed liquid-e.g., in the steel, chemical, and foundry industries-also remove gaseous pollutants (Brauer and Varma, 1981; Theodore and Buonicore, 1982) . Absorption technologies, which create residual molecular forces at the surface of solids to attract molecules of gases and vapors, also provide a good example since they lead to simultaneous removal of dust and gaseous pollutants from a gas mixture. Examples of this technology include the absorption of S02 , NO x , hydrogen flouride, and hydrogen chloride, as well as particulate matter from stack gases (ibid).
The facts that large numbers of single sources emit multiple pollutants and current abatement technologies are coarse imply that a number of important pollution problems are correlated. It therefore seems appropriate to call such problems "correlated externalities." In the presence of correlated externalities, previous mechanisms designed to control single externality problems are therefore incomplete. Their adoption would necessarily create inefficiencies since the correlated effects of policy instruments would be neglected. This paper provides a first step in characterizing an efficient mechanism for a situation featuring correlated externalities.
lFine abatement technologies would single out pollutants, enabling the controlling sources to deal with each pollutant separately.
The model developed herein draws its motivation from the previous literature on transboundary pollution control, as well as the literatures on ambient markets for the spatial control of non-uniformly mixed pollutants (c.f., Ermoliev, et aI., 2000; Lintner and Weersink, 1999; Cabe and Herriges, 1992; Lence, 1991; and Segerson, 1988) , the control of multiple sources and types of pollutants (c.f., Hoel, 1992 and Michaelis, 1992) , and the more recent literature on linking domestic and global tradable permit markets (c.f., Jensen, 2002; Yamin, 2002; and Vis, 2002) . It extends the transboundary-pollution literature by accounting for correlated externalities, and extends the ambient-market literature by accounting for the fact that spatiality often entails crossing jurisdictional boundaries. We also provide an interesting comparison of the effectiveness of different policy instruments (taxes vs. transferable permits) in controlling correlated externalities.
Our results have strong implications for international treaties designed to control global externality problems. As a prime example, the Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (October 2001, Marrakech, Morocco), which was successful in finalizing both the underlying legal texts and the accounting system for the Kyoto Protocol, considers the control of global carbon-equivalent emissions in isolation from the control of accompanying pollutants that cause localized externality problems. Yet, these externality problems are inextricably linked. To efficiently control them, policies developed at the international level to control climate change must be linked with regional policies aimed at controlling regional pollution problems.
As we show below, a decentralized mechanism that induces regional governments to simultaneously and endogenously control the regional and global externalities at efficient levels requires the governments to condition their regional pollution permit markets on the global pollution pennit market established by the international agreement. Using joint emissions taxes instead of joint pennit markets does not lead to an efficient outcome. In effect, we find that parties to international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol can benefit by developing separate pennit markets to control regional externalities in conjunction with an international pennit market to control greenhouse gas emissions.
The next section presents the basic correlated externality model with joint abatement technology and characterizes the Pareto efficient solution. Section 3 presents the case of joint emissions pennit markets-separate markets to control the regional externalities and one international market to control the global externality-and shows that this mechanism is efficient under decentralized leadership within a global federation. This section also examines the conditions under which the efficient mechanism is implementable. Section 4 examines an alternative mechanism-joint emissions taxes-and shows why this mechanism is inefficient under the decentralized-leadership regime. Section 5 concludes.
A Correlated Externality Model
Consider a global economy consisting of J > 2 regions indexed by j, and Ij > 1 energy finns indexed by ij in each region j. 2 Assume nj consumers are located in region j. The utility of a representative consumer in region j is uj (Xj,yj,gj,e) , where Xj, yj, gj, and e = L j e j are respectively the quantities consumed of a numeraire good, energy, a regional pollutant, and a global pollutant. For the sake of illustration we call the global pollutant "carbon" and the local pollutant "smog". We assume that J is strictly quasi-concave, increasing in the first two arguments, and decreasing in the last two arguments. Net emissions of smog and carbon are, for example, hannful to each individual's health. 2We can think of an energy fIrm as representing any type of fIrm that produces embodied energy.
Let net emissions of carbon in regionj be e j = Lij ejj =Lij(Y jj -(a~ + "la~ )), where Yij is the total quantity of energy produced by energy firm ij in region j, a~ is total amount of abatement of eij produced by firm ij in region j, a ~ is the total amount of abatement of gij produced by firm ij in regionj. The term ye (0, 1] represents the fraction of firm ij's abatement effort of smog that also reduces eij. For example, ye may be the fraction of carbon emissions removed by firm ij 's application of a jet scrubber technology to remove dust particles at level a~ .
Similarly, net emissions of smog in region j is defined as gj = Lijgjj =Lij(Y jj -(a~ + 'Yga~ )), where in this case yg (0, 1] represents the fraction of firm ij's abatement effort of carbon that also reduces gij. For example, yg may be the fraction of dust particles removed by firm ij' s application of an absorption technology to remove carbon emissions at level a~.
To keep things simple, we normalize the price of numeraire good to one, and let rj equal the competitively-determined price of energy in region j. Region j' s total income is represented
where x~ is an initial endowment of the numeraire good (e. 
The representative consumer's problem is therefore to maximize u j by choosing {Xj,Yj} subj ect to (2), taking rj, gj, and e as given. This results in (2) and
i.e., the standard consumer-maximization result where the marginal rate of substitution is set equal to the inverse price ratio (subscripts denote the associated partial derivatives). Equations (2) and (3) implicitly define the consumer's demand functions x j == x j (rj' w j' g j' e) and Firm ij' s profit from energy production is defined as
h h I fu· ij .
. I 7r -rj ij -C ij' a ij , a ij + P e ij -e ij + v j gij -gjj ,were t e tota cost nctIon c IS stnct y increasing and convex in each term; p equals the price of a carbon emissions permit; Vj equals the price of a smog permit in region j; eij is the quantity of carbon emissions permits initially allocated to firm ij in region j as a result of negotiations among all of the regions of the federation (L j Lij eij = e = e); and gij is the quantity of smog permits initially allocated to firm ij in region j by the regional government (Lij gjj = g j = g j ).
3 Energy firm ij' s problem is therefore to maximize 1t ij by choosing {Y ij , a ~ , a ~ }, taking
gij' e ij and all prices as given, resulting in 3We further assume that c lyyU ( C ij g g + c ij e e) -(C J y . g + C J y . e)2 > 0 , which along with the quasi-concavity aa aa a a condition for the representative agents' utility functions ensures concave programming problems for each of the ensuing games analyzed below.
( 4) which is the standard profit-maximization result associated with the choices of energy output and abatement of smog and carbon. Equations (4) implicitly define energy firm ij' s demand and gij == gij (rj' p, v j) as well as its indirect profit function 7r ij == 7r ij (rj' p, v j' e ij , gij ).
Equilibrium clearing conditions for the regional energy markets, the regional smog permit markets, and the carbon permit market, respectively, occur where,
representative consumers, we assume the regional governments and the GEF take {rj}j as given.
Unlike the energy firms, however, these governmental authorities have enough information to completely internalize the effects of their policy choices of {gj}j' {ej}j' and {7 j }j on permit prices {v j}j and p in the environmental policy games described below.
Before we analyze the making of environmental policy, it is useful to consider the conditions that characterize a Pareto efficient allocation. For a fixed set of social welfare weights 8 = {8 j 10 < 8j < 1, j = 1, .... J, j8j = I}, a Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained as a solution to the following problem:
The first-order conditions are (1), (2), (3),
(8)
Equation (6) shows that the marginal utilities of the numeraire good (normalized by the welfare weights and populations) are equated across all regions. Equations (7}-(9) are modified Samuelson conditions for an impure public good, equating the marginal social benefits of an additional unit of the economic activity with its associated social marginal cost. The equality in (7) pertains to the choice of firm ij's energy output, while the equalities in (8) and (9) pertain to the choices of firm ij' s abatement efforts of smog and carbon, respectively. 4 Therefore, equations (1}-(4) and (6}-(9) characterize the Pareto efficient solution.
We will now compare the efficient allocation above with an allocation that emerges from a purely decentralized environmental policy system. Suppose the regional governments choose their two vectors of abatement levels {a~, a~j} independently of one another, where the vectors 4Note that equations (8) and (9) imply that the familiar cost-minimization result of equalized marginal costs of abatement across fIrms within a given region is not satisfIed by a Pareto-effIcient allocation. This result occurs because of the joint-abatement cost confIguration of our problem. 9 are defined over all finns i in regionj. To begin with, finn ij's necessary condition for profit maximization, equation (4), becomes rj -c~ = 0, which violates efficiency condition (7). The violation occurs because there is no mechanism (e.g. market) to induce the finn to internalize the negative externalities associated with its energy production. From this condition, finn ij's implicit energy supply curve can be written as Yij == Y j j (rj' a~, a~). Because the regional governments choose {a~ ,a~} independently of one another, the representative consumer's implicit demands obtained from his utility maximization problem may be written as
Regional government j' s problem is therefore, 
Now, we make the following three substitutions. First, substitute firm ij 's first-order condition into (11). Second, substitute (11) into (lOa). Third, substitute into (lOa) the representative consumer's first-order condition (3) and the energy-market equilibrium condition.
Rewriting the resulting expression we have ViE I j and V j E J ,
Repeating the same exercise for a~ results in,
Conditions (12) and (13) violate efficiency conditions (8) and (9) because there is no mechanism to induce the regions to account for the transboundary benefits associated with their choices of {a~, a~ }.
5 Since the regional governments do not make interregional transfers, the allocation also fails to satisfy efficiency condition (6). Thus, a purely decentralized environmental policy fails on each margin except with respect to the representative consumer's utility maximizing choice. For future reference, let {UjD}j be the set of regional welfares that result from the purely decentralized environmental policy game.
Joint Emissions Permit Markets
We now analyze the allocation of resources under a game with permit markets for both smog and carbon. This game consists of three stages. In the first stage, each regional 5Regarding region j , s choice of an, the mechanism would need to correct for the fact that the regional government in a sense 'over-compensates' for the marginal effects ofeacha~ on each corresponding Yij (by the terms (n .u g j / u~ Y ay. / aa~) and (n .u j / u~ Y ay . / aa~) in (12)). Similarly for (13) with respect to the terms
(nju~ / u~ XaY ij / aaiJ and (nju~ / u~ XaY ij / aaij)' government agency charged with fonnulating its region's policy to control carbon-henceforth, the "carbon agency"-decides on its initial allocation of carbon emissions pennits, taking as given the price of energy and each other regional government's decision. Having observed the regional governments' decisions concerning their initial carbon pennit allocations, the GEF decides in the second stage of the game the levels of the interregional income transfers. In the third and final stage, each regional governmental agency charged with fonnulating its region's policy to control the local pollutant-henceforth, the "smog agency"-decides its initial allocation across all finns ij E j J of smog pennits, taking as given the price of energy and each other regional government's decision. The equilibrium concept used for the game is sub-game perfection.
It is important to note that since the GEF and the regional governmental authorities take as given the decisions of the consumers and energy finns in each region, equations (1)- (5) naturally obtain in this game's equilibrium.
The Third Stage of the Game
Through backward induction, we start at the last stage of the game. In this stage, region j's smog agency choosesg j to maximize its regional welfare. Appendix 1 shows that this decision problem results in (14) as well as the smog agency's pennit-allocation-response function, gj = gj (w j (e j 1 e j ), E j J.
Equations (14) reveal that each smog agency chooses the level of smog up to the point where the price of a pennit just equals the value of the region's aggregate welfare loss associated with an additional unit of smog. The regional markets for smog therefore work as they should-the equilibrium price of a permit reflects the social marginal damage associated with an additional unit of smog in each respective region.
The Second Stage of the Game
In this stage, we assume that the GEF's objective function is a weighted global welfare function as follows:
W({u j })= Lj8juj(xj(Wj' gj(wj1e1Yj(wj,gj(wj1e1gj(wj1e1 12 that is, the same objective function of the Pareto efficiency problem examined above. 6 The GEF takes {r j , x j' y j' Yij' a~, a~, gj' e}j as given and chooses the set {7 j }j to maximize W( {u j }) subject
to Lj't j =0 and (15) Equations (15) represent the participation constraints for this game. Voluntary participation is necessary for the effectiveness of the game's agreement. Since there is potential for the agreement to Pareto improve upon the status quo, all participation constraints may be satisfied nonbinding in the sub-game perfect equilibrium for this game. If the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient, there will be a range of e values under which all regions will be strictly better offby participating in the agreement.
We shall make it our working hypothesis that the participation constraints are satisfied slack in the equilibrium for the second stage and later show that this is indeed a possibility.
We now make two important observations about the GEF's problem. First, it is straightforward to show that we can substitute {Wj} j for {'tj} j as the GEF's choice set. The constraint L j 't j = 0 can therefore be rewritten as 6Energy prices {rj}j have been suppressed in the implicit functions for each regionj.
Second, inspection of the first order conditions reveals that the GEF's transfer-response functions depend solely upon changes in the level of the global externality. Hence, the implicit function theorem enables us to write w j == w j (e), t j J. 7
As shown in Appendix 1, differentiation of the global resource constraint yields
[ dg . dg. dw. J
The terms on the right-hand side of (16) capture the effects of an additional carbon permit on the value of carbon and smog (aggregated over all regions), respectively. Note that in a sub-game perfect equilibrium, the GEF is aware of (or correctly guesses) the permit allocation responses of each of the smog agencies. Equation (16) will be used later to show that the sub-game perfect equilibrium for this game is indeed efficient.
Also shown in Appendix 1, the GEF's choice of interregional transfers satisfies (6). It therefore redistributes the numeraire good among the regions through its transfer mechanism up to the point where the marginal utilities of the numeraire good (normalized by the welfare weights in its maximization problem) are equal across the regions.
The First Stage of the Game
In this stage, regionj's carbon agency chooses e j to maximize its regional welfare. In doing so, the carbon agency correctly guesses the GEF's transfer-response function for its region, as well as the smog agency's permit-allocation response function. As shown in Appendix 1, the carbon agency's problem results in, 7A simple example is worked out in Appendix 2 for the case of two regions, where the transfer-response functions are instead calculated directly. (17) Equations (17) Proof: First, note that equations (1)- (6) hold for the game. Substituting equations (14) and (17) recursively into the three equalities of equations (4) for each respective region results in equations (7)-(9). Therefore, each of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a Pareto efficient solution is satisfied for this game.
Proposition 1 tells us that the redistributive transfers implemented by the GEF, in concert with an international permit market for carbon and separate smog permit markets, are powerful enough to nullify each region's incentive to ignore the negative externalities caused by its own emissions. Since the modified Samuelson conditions are satisfied in the equilibrium of the game, equations (14) and (17) clearly demonstrate that each firm in each respective region faces its set of Lindahl prices when it chooses how much carbon and smog to emit (these prices are the carbon and smog permit prices, respectively). This implies that each firm (and thus each region) has no unilateral incentive to deviate from fully internalizing both the regional and global externalities. The mechanism therefore induces not only an efficient allocation of carbon and smog, but it is also self-enforcing.
It is important to point out that Proposition 1 holds if the participation constraints are satisfied slack in equilibrium. Since the purely decentralized (i.e., status quo) allocation is inefficient and the equilibrium allocation for this game is efficient when the participation constraints are ignored, there exists a range of 8 values under which all regions can be made better offby participating in the game-i.e., the equilibrium allocation is such that each region's welfare is not less than its purely decentralized welfare U jD . We shall assume henceforth that the designers of the game-that is, the regional governments themselves-agree before ratification on a distribution of 8 parameters that will make all regions better off upon completion of the game.
Such an agreement may emerge, for example, from a Nash bargaining game played by the regions prior to the commencement of the game.
In two closely related studies, and examine a noncooperative "global warming game" where carbon emissions and international transfers are determined.
8 As in this paper, they assume that there is an international agency in charge of implementing redistributive transfers across nations. is mostly concerned with examining the efficiency and implementability properties of an international transfer mechanism that obeys a predetermined "proportional equity" principle. They find that a proportional equity scheme is Pareto efficient. While their model allows for commodity trading, it does not allow for emissions trading. allow for both commodity and emissions trading, and show that the ensuing equilibrium is efficient. These studies, however, do not consider the correlation of regional and global externalities. 8Chichilnisky, et al. (2000) arrive at a similar result, where the GEF determines an ex ante initial allocation of permits rather than ex post international transfers.
Joint Emissions Taxes
Although a "harmonized" set of emissions taxes can be set exogenously (i.e. without the guarantee of self-enforcement) by the regions to simultaneously control for the global and regional externalities, the more important question of whether a joint set of taxes endogenously (i.e., with the guarantee of self-enforcement) leads to a Pareto efficient allocation of the externalities E similar to the joint permit markets described above-has yet to be investigated.
It is easy to see that if the carbon agencies agree to exogenously set (18) and each of the smog agencies exogenously set J (19) then, using the energy firms' corresponding optimality conditions (20) the modified Samuelson conditions (7)- (9) obtain. Indeed, given (20), (18) and (19) are the unique tax rules that result in conditions (7)- (9), similar in nature to the tax rules derived in Hoel (1992) and Michaelis (1992) .
However, as Chichilnisky, et al. (2000) have also shown, there is no mechanism in place to satisfy condition (6). Thus, the Pareto efficient allocation itself does not necessarily obtain.
Moreover, nothing ensures that each region j will in fact find it desirable to implement (18) and (19) on its own.
The problem with joint emissions taxes unfortunately does not stop there. Endogenizing the tax instruments in a mechanism similar to that described for the joint permit markets in Section 3 does not restore Pareto efficiency. As Appendix 3 shows, the mechanism provides incorrect incentives to each region with respect to their choices of the tax instruments. Despite the fact that an efficient allocation of the numeraire good is restored, the respective tax rules do not engender the regions' respective Lindahl prices, i.e. they do not satisfy conditions (18) and (19). Thus, the allocations of carbon and smog are inefficient. In particular, under joint taxation we obtain the following rules, J
derivations of these two conditions). Without these bounding effects provided by the separate permit markets, both the smog and carbon agencies in each region lack the proper incentives to set their respective tax rates at efficient levels, even though the GEF ' s transfer policy is both efficient and responsive to the agencies' tax-rate choices. In particular, without the quantity constraint at the global level (for carbon) being chosen directly by the regions themselves, the property of "incentive equivalence"-where each region is constrained by its overall effect on its neighboring regions-is lost.
Conclusions
This paper represents an initial step in comparing the effectiveness of permit markets and emissions taxes to control correlated externalities with joint abatement technology when control over the relevant policy instruments is shared by a hierarchy of independent governments and governmental agencies. Perhaps most restrictive is the full-information sub-game equilibrium concept used to determine the model ' s outcomes. Future research might therefore incorporate both uncertainty and alternative game-theoretic equilibrium concepts in order to further test the robustness of the paper's main finding that joint permit markets are Pareto efficient and selfenforcing under jurisdictional competition, while joint emissions taxes are not.
Restrictive though the general framework for this paper is, several features of the model reflect a realistic picture of the constraints inherent in the control of transboundary pollution problems. Foremost among these constraints are the correlated nature of regional and global pollutants, technologies that provide various degrees of joint abatement, and the inescapable fact that a hierarchy of governmental institutions-often with competing objectives-are jointly responsible for enacting the policies and enforcement mechanisms that ultimately determine the levels at which these pollution problems are controlled. Having forgotten these constraints, proponents of "harmonized" or "multiple" emissions taxes may be overlooking a crucial objective, that market-based mechanisms not only induce an efficient outcome, but also one that is self-enforcing. 
Substituting into this expression conditions (4) and the respective total differentiations of (5b) and (5c) 
which is (16) in the text.
Note that (B1) corresponds to (6), (B2) to (3), and (B3)-(B5) to (7)-(9). Market-clearing conditions (5a)-(5c) also hold.
For the joint permit mechanism, the energy firms' respective profit maximization problems result in,
which corresponds to (4). The representative consumers' problems result in (B2) and their respective budget constraints.
In the third stage, the local pollutant agency in region 1 solves, resulting in the first-order condition (B7a) Similarly for region 2, (B7b) Note that (B7a) and (B7b) correspond to conditions (14) and respectively define each region's domestic-permit-allocation response function gj = gj (7 j (e j 1 e j ). Totally differentiating (B7a) and (B7b) with respect to 1"j and e j results in 
Combining (B7a), (B7b), and (BI3) recursively with (B6) results in (B3)-(BS).
Appendix 3
To begin, note that with joint taxes firm ij' s profit function is the same as defined in 
